1989年10月1日前夕,上海市府举办招待酒会,庆祝PRC 建国40周年。来宾中有美国驻上海总领事。原上海复旦大学校长谢希德,在招待酒会上主动问美国总领事“我们要作甚麽事,才能解决方励之问题?”。大使立即将谢的举动转告我们。
我们判断:“这是邓小平发出的信号,中共想要解决问题了。” 大使也持同样看法。
谢希德的学术身份,是一位物理学教授,专长于点群空间群在固体物理中的应用。谢的政治身份,是中共中央委员。谢是从美国回归者。八十年代,她每年至 少去美国一次,代表中国物理学会参加美国物理学会年会。谢认识李和我。早在1950年代后期,谢一度从上海来北大物理系工作,协助黄昆建立半导体研究班 子,直到这时,谢才入党。当时李淑娴也在黄昆的班子中,是一位援华的苏联半导体副教授的专业翻译。谢行事极为谨慎,作风更像虔诚基督徒。谢不会自作主张向 美国总领事询问“方励之问题”,一定是高层授意的。
跟着,又有两个信号。
中国科学院长周光召在访问美国时,也以“个人身份”向美国科学院透露,他“可以协助解决方励之问题”。我们同周光召认识的时间更长。大学二年级,李和我听胡宁的电动力学课时,周是胡的助教和研究生。周在1989年的政治身份,也是中共中央委员。
最后,原任中共政治局委员的胡乔木出马,向李侃如 (Kenneth Lieberthal)说,他“愿意以非正式的身份斡旋方励之问题“。李是中国问题专家,与美前总统尼克松有密切关系。胡乔木也是一位持续关心方的高层人 士。1985年,“科学”(中文)杂志复刊,方在复刊第一期上发表科普文——“道生一的物理解”,介绍量子宇宙学。该年12月16日,胡乔木写信给“科 学”编辑部,云:“‘科学’复刊第一期上,刊有方励之的‘道生一的物理解’一文,用宇宙物理学来证明……唯物主义的事物先于原理的观点是错误的…..我没 有研究过宇宙物理学,但很以这种观点为异。”其实,方文丝毫未谈哲学,只是讲一个逻辑常识:在“时间”概念不能用的情况下,“先于”“后于”等等词汇,在 物理上均无意义。“科学”主编郝柏林回信给胡,请他撰写一篇科学而非哲学文章,详细论述他的“为异”观点,“科学” 杂志将发表。但没有得到胡的回应。
尽管上述三位皆位高权重,但其“个人身份”似乎都还不足以斡旋“避难”等政治问题。他们的个人政治身份大体是一品“龙套”。
“龙套”跑圆场之后,真正有资格以“个人身份”斡旋者,登场了:大使告知,
尼克松和基辛格将于近日访华,老朋友邓小平要见他们,斡而旋之。
在尼—基—邓三位登场之前,还有一桩趣事。
10月28日,是美国的万圣节,叫鬼节更准确,否则会混同巴黎万圣庙。大使馆将举行招待会。按风俗,参加者可以戴假面具。有传言,招待会上,众来宾 都戴一样的面具,男士一律用方励之面相,女士一律用李淑娴面相。当上百位全同的方李假面狂欢痛饮,晃动于大使馆之际,方李二真身,将溜之乎也。中国当局听 说后,急了,外交部召见大使,要求美方不得趁鬼节招待会把方励之夫妇偷送出使馆。这一次,大使快速承诺:保证不在鬼节这一天,送走他们的客人。
万圣节当天确实有一批客人抬着一个美国真棺材(运尸备用),其中装有一个鬼模型,闯进大使馆。令守卫的解放军不知所措。
大使很得意告诉我们,“传言”等就是他们造的,目的是探测内鬼。“三国演义”中,蒋干盗书一场,周瑜派人在蒋干帐外小声嘀咕,放假消息(蔡瑁张允通敌)。李洁明用的就是周瑜的帐外嘀咕法,探测泄密渠道。
李洁明确实极重视保密。每次他来谈话,总要把屋里水龙头开开,制造背景噪声,使窃听者听不清。流水噪音是反窃听的一个经典方法,有效,但是略显老 了。用适当的统计处理就可以从背景噪音中取出有用信息。这是物理,特别是天体物理的一个课题。上帝让我们看到的天空,除了太阳东升西落等少数有规现象之 外,其它现象看起来都是杂乱无章的“噪声”。从上帝的噪声中“窃听”出有用信息,是天体物理的任务。
尼克松—基辛格—邓小平
美国当局得知尼克松及基辛格将访华后,曾委托尼克松及基辛格在会见邓小平时,斡旋“方励之问题”。Bill Stanton说,尼克松一口答应了,愿意帮助斡旋,而基辛格则回绝,不愿介入“方励之问题”。李洁明的回忆录不提基辛格,也是一个旁证[1]。
1989年10月31日和11月9日,邓小平分别会见了他的‘老朋友’ 尼克松和基辛格。
邓小平见到基辛格后,主动同他谈“方励之问题”。直到这时基辛格才不得不出主意,参与斡旋[2]。所以,严格说来,尼克松是美国当局委托的斡旋者,而基辛格应算是邓小平委托的斡旋者。
二斡旋者传来的邓小平的解决“方励之问题”的路线图是:
Former President Nixon and former Secretary of State Kissinger shared with us the thoughts recently expressed to them by Deng Xiaoping regarding a possible path to speedy resolution of the Fang Lizhi situation.
Mr. Deng suggested to President Nixon – that the best solution is a “simple” one. I would like now to restate our understanding of what Mr. Deng said in general terms:
A statement regarding his activities will be required of Fang Lizhi.
There should be agreement by Dr. Fang not to engage in political activities.
Dr. Fang and his family should be removed from China, preferably to the United States.
(此段取自talking point Nov. 18. 见附录[3])
路线图大意是,可以放走方励之全家,条件是: a.) 方励之应写个陈述,说明他的活动;b.) 应有保证,方不得从事政治活动;c.) 方全家应离开中国,最好去美国。基辛格建议,点c.) 改成“去第三国”。
路线图还有关键一句——“the best solution is a ‘simple’ one”。什麽是 ‘simple’ one ?尼克松及基辛格可能都没有在意,或邓有意没说清。
条件 a.)和c.) 不难办到。b.) 的含义要在谈判中澄清。美方的立场是:
There are limited to any U.S. government control over Dr. Fang and his family, now and in the future. The U.S. government cannot legally offer guarantees regarding what an individual in the United States might say or do. I believe that Dr. Fang and his family understand this point. (此段取自talking point Nov. 18. 见附录 [3])
根据美国宪法,行政当局不能控制方励之一家在美国的言行。 美国行政当局依法不能对一个在美生活的人的所做所为提供保证。
这一点,同中国的政体完全不同。
11月15日,我正准备写点a.)所要求的陈述,李洁明大使送来了如下中国有关部门敦促书。抄录如下:
中国有关部门发言人发表谈话,敦促方励之、李淑娴尽早投案自首,争取宽大处理。
发言人说,在全国人民的积极支持下,我们已赢得制止动乱、平息反革命暴乱的决定性胜利。当前社会秩序业已恢复正常,国内局势更加稳定。在党和政府政策的感召下,不少在动乱和暴乱中犯有罪行的人向公安机关投案,得到了宽大处理。
发言人说,自平息反革命暴乱后,先后有几名中国人躲进了外国驻华使馆。目前,除方励之、李淑娴二人仍躲在美国驻华大使馆外,其他人均已先后离开了外国驻华机构,得到了政府的宽大处理和人民的谅解。
发言人敦促方励之和李淑娴迷途知返,赶快离开美国驻华使馆,争取宽大处理。
敦促书与路线图的调子完全不同。路线图点a)是要求写一陈述,而敦促书是典型的文化大革命语言:未审判,先定罪,“迷途知返”“投案自首”,“宽大 处理”云云。敦促书的调子应是邓小平的原意,显然,“老朋友”斡旋者们都不接受邓小平原话。这一段话被斡旋成了中性的“陈述”。基辛格的回忆,描写了这一 斡旋[2]。
敦促书证实:“躲进了外国驻华使馆”者,除方李一案,还有他案。并证实,他案均已解决。这同我们在大使馆知道的信息一致。重要的是,敦促书并没有说那“几名中国人”问题之解决,是由于写了自首书。看中共的文件,要看它写了什麽,更要看它没写什麽。
所以可以不管敦促书。按点a.) ,我写了一个有关“过去和将来”的陈述。全文如下。
过去和将来
关于过去
1, 我主张中国应当进行社会改革。我在1988年以前的多次演讲中,公开地表达过我对中国的改革的观点。
2,我承认,我的观点主要有:
a.马克思主义的三个组成部分,哲学、政治经济学和社会主义理论,都已经落后于时代。它的一些基本原则,已经被科学证明是过时的,或者是不正确的。
b.所有社会主义国家在社会主义体制下所做的事情,差不多总的来说是失败的。列宁—斯大林—毛泽东式的社会主义已经相当彻底地丧失了它的吸引力。
c.中国共产党治理下的社会主义中国四十年是令人失望的。连年不断的大规模的“阶级斗争”使中国的经济一直逗留在世界第一百位以后的最贫穷行列之中。中共本身的腐化,则越演越烈。
d.没有民主、人权,就不会有现代化。应当修改宪法,取消有关“阶级斗争”的内容。四项基本原则与毛泽东的六条政治标准是类似的,是维持“阶级斗争”的政治体制。在这方面,四项原则如仍僵化不变,民主、现代化都是没有希望的。
3. 1989年4月发生于天安门的以学生为首的政治运动,其目的是推动中国政府加快改革,其方法是和平的。因此,我完全赞同并支持。我也赞同根据宪法第63条通过人大罢免李鹏的总理职务。
4. 我认真地注意到,于1989年6月开始,中国政府称,上述的政治主张是“反革命的”,上述行为是"犯有反革命的宣传和煽动罪"。
关于将来
1. 应北美和西欧20余所大学及研究所的邀请,我此次出国的目的将集中于学术交流和研究。
2. 作为一个中国公民,我关注的是,中国的和平、繁荣和现代化。
3. 因此,我将欣赏和欢迎世界各国政府符合于中国社会进步的一切活动;拒绝支持那些组织,如果它们不以中国进步利益为原则。
4. 一俟条件许可,我将回国继续直接为发展中国的科学与教育事业服务。
11月18日和24日的谈判
11月18日和24日,中美就邓小平的路线图举行了两次谈判。两次谈判的“要点”文件全文在附录 [3] 及 [4] 中。
“要点”文件是由D.W. Keyser草拟的。此公中文极好。可惜后来堕入台湾女情报人员织的情网,主动转送国务院机密文件给该女。2004年被当场抓获。外交生涯就此终止。
18日谈判,美方由李洁明代表。24日谈判,美方由公使 B.L.Pascoe代表,因李洁明当时回国述职。Pascoe 现为联合国副秘书长,负责政治事务。
18日谈判时,李洁明告知对方,我在写一陈述。24日谈判时,Pascoe 将“过去和将来”一陈述交给对方。路线图点a.)完成。
点c.), 无论去美国或第三国,中立国或非中立国都不是问题。几个月来,凡与我有过交往的同行,西欧的和北美的,大都来了邀请信,有的还提供永久职位。第一个提供永 久职位的是挪威奥斯陆大学物理系,1989年6月23日,即我们进入使馆的第17天,正式offer信就收到了(直到21年后,2010年,我才有机会造 访奥斯陆大学,登门致谢)。
谈判的焦点是点b.)。如前所述,美方强调,按美国政体,特别按宪法第一修正案,行政当局不能控制任何个人的言论。美行政当局也不可能保证方励之到 美后不参与政治活动。就是对方励之写给中国当局的陈述,美行政当局也不能为之背书。此种保证或背书,应是方与中国当局之间的事。美行政当局只能为双方传递 信息。美国行政当局只能承诺,布什总统等不会接见方。
这当然使邓小平没面子。李洁明曾告,“方励之问题”谈判有时在钓鱼台宾馆举行。谈判者都在一楼,二楼也有人。以他在CIA学的本事,他猜测邓小平就在二楼“监听”。
为了破解点b.) 僵局,在18及24日谈判中时,都用了一下一段话,使双方都有面子。这段话是在(见附录[3][4]):
We understand that Dr. Fang would offer full assurances to my Government that he would engage exclusively in scientific and scholarly research for a period of time following his departure from China.
大意是,方励之向美国政府作了充分保证,他离开中国后,在一段时间里,将专心致志于科学研究。技巧是“在一段时间里”(for a period of time)。到底是多长?一天?一个月?一年?十年?没说。所以,并无定量约束,整句话等于是不可检验的废话。但废话能使各方都有脸,这就是废话的功效。
可以清楚地感到,“不从事政治活动”等等保证,并不是邓小平的“核心条件”。因为邓小平自己有过类似经验,他“向毛主席保证” 的 “永不翻案”,是出名的。所以,这种情况下的“保证”,除了面子之外,并无实际价值。
邓小平的“核心条件”不是a),不是 b), 也不是c)。
斯考克罗夫特访华
12月9日,Bill兴冲冲跑来,告诉好消息;“赶快准备好,也许明天就能走!”背景是,布什再度派特使斯考克罗夫特访问北京,今天到。大使等估 计,a.), b.), c.) 诸点都已谈妥。等斯考克罗夫代表布什同邓小平最后一拍板,方李就可以随斯考克罗夫特的飞机离境了。大使馆充满乐观气氛,圣诞节前,“事件”就可以圆满收场 了。
准备行装容易,一小时足够了。12月10日晨,我们打点好行装,待命——
一直到晚上,“命”也没“待”来,转为睡觉。
斯考克罗特一边的故事,在他的回忆录中有详尽描述 [5]。他到达北京后,当晚外交部长钱其琛举行欢迎酒会。当时美国对中国当局的制裁(停止经援,停止高官互访等)还没有结束。斯考克罗夫特希望酒会低调, 回避媒体,不要拍照,否则回美国不好交待。主人同意,只准媒体于酒会前双方寒暄时拍照。酒会则是闭门吃喝,拒绝媒体观赏。
酬来酢去,一切顺利。最后,轮到斯考克罗夫特致答词了,他向主人祝酒。说时迟,那时快,突然闯进一批电视记者,录像镜头对准斯考克罗夫特,外加闪光拍照。显然,这是主人有意安排的,目的是以斯考克罗夫特的祝酒证明,中美关系正常化了。
斯考克罗夫特说,对此突袭,他当时极为狼狈。只有两个选择。1. 终止祝酒,后果是,此行失败,打道回府;2. 继续祝酒,第二天美国报纸的标题就会是,“斯考克罗夫特向天安门屠夫祝酒”。权衡利弊,斯考克罗夫特还是硬着头皮选择了祝酒。斯考克罗夫特“赌”的是,此 行会有重要成果。到那时,就不怕媒体报导祝酒了。
所以,斯考克罗夫特这篇祝酒词,看似平常,实则不同一般,值得一看 [6]。通篇祝酒词没有提到人权和北京的坦克,只在一处提及天安门事件(event)。后来,中共的用词,也从最初的天安门反革命暴乱,逐渐变到天安门动 乱,再到天安门风波,最后到天安门事件,与斯考克罗夫特用词一样。祝词结尾,斯考克罗夫特举杯
“May I propose a toast to the People’s Republic of China
--- to the health of President Yang(杨尚昆)
--- to the great Chinese People
--- and to U.S. – Chinese friendship”
对主人,斯考克罗夫特算是给足了面子。
第二天,即我们“待命”的一天,斯考克罗夫特连续地拜会了中国的所有首脑,外交部长钱其琛,总理李鹏,总书记江泽民,最后是邓小平。直到这时,邓小平一方才亮出了底牌——拿钱放人。即,除了上述a.), b.), c.) 三点之外,同时还有“核心条件”:
d.)美国解除对中国的经济制裁,恢复贷款;
e.)美方邀请江泽民访美。
这才明白,邓小平的‘simple’one,意为一次性,或“一揽子解决”中美之间的各项问题。是由于尼克松,基辛格二位斡旋人都没有听明白邓小平的‘simple’one 的含义?或者邓小平根本没有向”老朋友说明白其含义?从基辛格的回忆录[2]看,答案大概是后者。
这才是真正的钉子。
斯考克罗夫特的回答是[6]:以解决“方励之问题”作为“解除对中国制裁”的交换条件,在美国是绝对不可能被接受的。解决“方励之问题”会有助于解决“经济制裁”,但二者不可能“挂钩”,或放在“一揽子”中。
邓小平等遵循的则是这一古老行业的传统行规——不见贖不松票。
双方没有妥协的余地,谈判破裂。
1989年尾
1989年尾,世界的热点西移。11月柏林墙倒了,12月26日罗马尼亚的齐奥塞斯库被处决了。我的苏联学界的朋友,在这时外流,跑到西欧和北美打工。
布什行政当局的注意力移到苏联和东欧。中国的问题暂时被搁置。
我呢?知道邓小平是按老行规行事,也就知道,已经没有我们多少事,可以安心作研究了(图1)。
年尾,大使馆也较清闲。有一天,大使来闲聊,说:“很抱歉,你是天体物理学家,而我们给你提供的住所连天都看不到。”我告诉他:“不必介意,理论天 体物理学家的特征之一是,不需要看天,就能告诉你天上会发生甚麽。天上的东西99%,是有眼也看不见的,看也白看,还不如不看。”
方励之
1989年12月22日,我的日记写道:“改定‘Periodicity of redshift distribution in a T-3 universe’”。这是用大使馆苹果机算出的第一篇论文。此文后来发表于Astronomy & Astrophysics, 239, (1990), 24。发表时,我们还没有离开大使馆。这篇论文在1990年一月曾作为美国费米实验室(Fermi National Acceleration Laboratory)的预印本发至世界各地的物理系,物理研究所,包括中国(图2)。其重要作用是使许多朋友知道我的在那里,如何通讯可以不通过中国邮 政的检查。
方励之
有了图2上公布的地址,我陆续收到大量同行寄来的文章、书籍,天体物理的主要期刊。我们收到的印刷品的数量之多,使负责转送外交邮件的信使都有“怨言”。 有一天,邮件实在太多了,他对大使说:“给方的邮件占用的外交邮包太多了,应当让物理学界专门向国务院交钱”。
恰好,一位在石溪 (University of New York at Stony Brook)理论物理研究所(现称杨振宁研究所)任职的朋友 Perry McCoy教授和夫人汤敦序(民主党骨干,不喜欢布什共和党当局)来信也说到交钱:
“今年我们将很高兴交税, 因为你在大使馆住,说明今年美国政府总算还作了一点好事”。
附录
[1] James Lilly,China Hands (PublicAffairs 2004)
[2] Henry Kissinger, On China (2011)
[3]. 1989年11月18日,谈判要点。
Talking Points: Meeting with VFM Liu Huaqiu, MFA
Saturday, November 18, 1989
I have asked for this appointment on a Saturday afternoon to begin discussion with you of the Fang Lizhi matter. I am authorized to do so by my government.
Former president Nixon and former secretary of state Kissinger shared with us the thoughts recently expressed to them by Deng Xiaoping regarding a possible path to speedy resolution of the Fang Lizhi situation. We understand that Mr. Deng made similar remarks to a visiting Japanese delegation a few days ago.
We share a desire to resolve this situation; we are prepared to proceed expeditiously to resolve the case; and we believe – as Mr. Deng suggested to president Nixon – that the best solution is a “simple” one.
I would like now to restate our understanding of what Mr. Deng said in general terms:
A statement regarding his activities will be required of Fang Lizhi.
There should be agreement by Dr. Fang not to engage in political activities.
Dr. Fang and his family should be removed from China, preferably to the United States.
My government believes that this general framework can serve as the basis for a resolution of the Fang case.
Our requirements with respect to the Fang Lizhi situation can also be stated simply:
We seek assurances that your government is prepared to guarantee and facilitate departure from China by Fang and his family to a destination overseas.
** If asked: by “family” I refer to Fang Lizhi, Li Shuxian and their son Fang Zhe.
Dr. Fang and his family, once overseas, should be free of harassment or the fear of arrest and free to pursue research and study as they wish.
We assume that the Chinese side would share our wish that agreement on departure of the Fang family would occasion a minimum of commentary by either side, and that such official comment would lay emphasis on the positive implications for development of our bilateral relationship.
We are prepared, as I have said, to work together with you to solve this problem expeditiously. It should not be unduly complicated to resolve, and we see no reason why we should not reach an understanding with you in very short order.
I wish at this time to offer some observations concerning our relationship with Dr. Fang and his family:
I understand that Dr. Fang is preparing a personal statement of this political beliefs which also addresses his role and thinking vis-a-vis the student movement.
There are limited to any U.S. government control over Dr. Fang and his family, now and in the future. The U.S. government cannot legally offer guarantees regarding what an individual in the United States might say or do. I believe that Dr. Fang and his family understand this point.
I understand that Dr. Fang would contemplate offering full assurance to my government that he would engage exclusively in scientific and scholarly research for a period of time following his departure from China.
But I must reiterate that any promises regarding Dr. Fang’s future behavior after he departs the Embassy must be between Dr. Fang his self and the Chinese government.
We are prepared to serve as the “mailman” between Dr. Fang and the Chinese in this regard without offering commitments on behalf of the U.S. government.
Of course, we will want to urge the Chinese government to accept Dr. Fang’s solemn commitments, but as I have said we will not be in apposition to enforce any agreement after Fang has departed.
As you are aware, I depart Monday for three weeks in the United States. I will return on December 13. In my absence, Lynn Pascoe will be charge d’affaires.
Mr. Pascoe will be prepared to work with you during the time I am away.
In conclusion, may I state once more that it is our common hope that we may now proceed to place our bilateral relationship back on a constructive footing.
I would like to hair the Vice Foreign Minister’s reactions.
Draft: POL: D W Keyser (incorporating new material from State 369399)
Cleared: DCM: B.L. Pascoe
[4], 1989年11月24日,谈判要点。
Talking Points: Dr. Fang Lizhi’s Statements on Past, Future
Friday, November 24, 1989
I have brought with me a statement which Dr. Fang Lizhi has asked that we convey to the Chinese Government. His statement is in two parts: the first deals with his past activities, the second with his intentions and wishes concerning the future. This is the statement which Ambassador Lilley indicated to you on November 18 that Dr. Fang was drafting.
We said previously that we knew of no reason that our two sides might not work to resolve this matter swiftly in our common interest. It is important for us to do so. We believe that Dr. Fang’s decision to draft a statement is significant, and will permit us to move ahead to the early resolution that we both desire.
I wish to reiterate points Ambassador Lilley earlier made to you concerning the role of the U.S. Government.
Dr. Fang’s statement is his alone. We are willing to facilitate communication between him and the Chinese Government – as we are doing today – but we are not in a position to offer commitments on behalf of the U.S. Government.
There are limits to any U.S. Government control over Dr. Fang and his family, both now and in the future. The U.S. Government cannot legally offer guarantees regarding what an individual in the United States, or in a third country, might say or do.
Any promises regarding Dr. Fang’s future behavior after he departs the Embassy must be between Dr. Fang himself and the Chinese Government. We understand that Dr. Fang would offer full assurances to my Government that he would engage exclusively in scientific and scholarly research for a period of time following his departure from China.
We continue to see considerable merit in a solution which involves initial quiet departure by Dr. Fang and his family to some third country.
Dr. Fang has received more than a dozen offers from various institutions to conduct scientific and scholarly research following his departure from China. These offers have been made by institutions in the United States and in such European countries as France, Italy and the Vatican.
If Dr. Fang and his family were to depart for one of these third countries, we anticipate that it would be easier to avoid the glare of media attention.
I would like to hear the Vice Foreign Minister’s reactions.
[5] George Bush & Brent Scowcroft,A World Transformed,(Knopf, 1998)
[6] 斯考克罗夫特的祝酒词,1989/12/9, 北京
Mr. Foreign Minister, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentleman:
My colleagues and I have come here today as friends, to resume our important dialogue on international questions of vital interest to both our nations. This is a dialogue which we believe has contributed to the historic, peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia and the world.
Last weekend, in another corner of the world, presidents Bush and Gorbachev held talks on the great issues of our day. Afterwards, president Bush instructed me to come to China and inform our Chinese hosts about the talks in Malta. There is nothing between the United States and the Soviet Union that needs to be hidden from the government of China. The peace and stability of the world are enhanced by this dialogue.
We also come today to bring new impetus and vigor into our bilateral relationship and seek new areas of agreement – economic, political, and strategic.
And we come to reduce the negative influence of irritants in the relationship.
We believe it is important that we not exhaust ourselves in the placing blame for problems that exist. Rather, by working together – within the values of our different social systems – we should seek to solve common problems and remove irritants.
It is the president’s strong desire to see these talks make progress and lay the groundwork for the solutions we seek.
Speaking as a friend, I would not be honest if I did not acknowledge that we have profound areas of disagreement – on the events at Tiananmen, on the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe. We see your complaints about us in the pages of People’s Daily.
But I recall that when we have found ways to work together, the world has been changed for the better; and when we have been at odds, needless tension and suffering were the result. In both our societies there are voices of those who seek to redirect or frustrate our cooperation. We both must take bold measures to overcome these negative forces.
In these meetings we seek to outline broad areas where agreement is possible, and to isolate for another time those areas of disagreement. The sooner e set about this task, the better. The path ahead will not be smooth and it will not be short.
But we have accomplished much when we have worked together in the past. I can cite scientific and technological exchanges, the departure of Soviet combat forces from Afghanistan, limits on missile proliferation, peace on the Korean peninsula, the withdrawal of Vietnam’s combat forces from Cambodia, mutually beneficial trade and investment, technology transfers, scholarly exchanges, and more. We – both side – must persevere. Now more than ever.
We are not China’s prime enemy or threat, as some would claim. But, like you, we are true to our own values, our heritage and traditions. We can be no other way. We extend our hand in friendship, and hope you will do the same.
May I propose a toast to the People’s Republic of China
--- to the health of President Yang
--- to the great Chinese People
--- and to U.S. – Chinese friendship”
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方励之谈六四后美中外交风暴(一)
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